Similar challenges, similar solutions? by Paula Silva-Ochoa (7221485) & Klaas Schwartz (7221488)
SILVA-OCHOA and SCHWARTZ
246
28th WEDC Conference Kolkata (Calcutta), India, 2002
Similar challenges, similar solutions?
Paula Silvs-Ochoa and Klaas Schwartz, Mexico
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AND WATER SERVICES
OVER THE PAST decade(s), private sector participation
(PSP), both in the irrigation and water supply and sanita-
tion (watsan) sectors, has increasingly been considered as a
possible alternative to mitigate the many problems facing
the delivery of water services. PSP was introduced in
Mexico in the irrigation and watsan sector in the 1990s.
The nature of PSP in these sectors, however, shows consid-
erable divergence. In addition, or perhaps as a result of the
different nature of PSP, the impact of PSP seems to be much
more beneficial in the irrigation sector than in the watsan
sector. The progress achieved in the irrigation sector, by
way of irrigation management transfer, stands in sharp
contrast with the difficulties experienced with increased
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of watsan
services.
These differences between the two sectors seem surpris-
ing as both sectors are quite comparable, have undergone
similar developments over the past decades and seem to be
facing the same challenges. This would lead one to assume
that a possible solution (increased PSP) to the current
challenges would also be similar. In this paper we under-
take a general comparison between PSP in the irrigation
and watsan sectors in Mexico in order to gain a better
understanding of the reasons why the nature of private
sector participation in these sectors diverge so strongly.
Moreover, we try to assess under what conditions, solu-
tions facing these two sectors would be similar.
Similar developments and challenges
The characteristics of the services provided by irrigation
and watsan organizations show strong similarities1. Both
are subject to high levels of excludability and subtractability
of services2, and both services require substantial ‘sunk’
capital costs3. Developments in both sectors are also com-
parable. In the 1970s there was a strong focus on hardware-
oriented solutions to the problems facing the sectors. Over
the past two decades, however, much more attention has
been focussed on the management (including participatory
approaches, etc.) of the existing systems, and to tailor these
systems to the demands of the users.
If the challenges facing many watsan companies are exam-
ined in comparison to the challenges of many organizations
in the irrigation sector again the similarities dominate.
Organizations in both sectors struggle with ineffective
operation and management practices of many water sys-
tems, high unaccounted-for-water levels (or inefficient
conveyance and distribution), low pricing for water serv-
ices, and polluted water sources (Saade 1997).
PSP in service provision in the Mexican
water sector
Reforms were introduced in the Mexican water sector in
the 1980s in the aftermath of a severe economic crisis. The
reforms, which were part of a larger economic liberaliza-
tion package, were introduced with the aim of reducing
government subsidies to the water sector (Johnson 1997,
Pablos 1999). In the irrigation sector reforms took the form
of irrigation management transfer which can be defined as
the relocation of responsibility and authority for irrigation
management from government agencies to non-govern-
mental organizations, such as water users’ associations
(Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999). In water supply and
sanitation, reforms consisted of a decentralization of serv-
ice provision responsibilities to the municipal level4. With
a few exceptions where State Law5 does not permit the
awarding of concessions for public services, municipalities
are free to opt for private sector involvement for the
delivery of watsan services.
Irrigation and management transfer
Understanding the need for reform in the water sector, the
Mexican government created the National Water Commis-
sion (CNA) in 1989. The CNA was given the explicit
mandate to define a new policy for the management of the
waters in Mexico (Johnson 1997). This led to the National
Program for Decentralization of the Irrigation Districts (the
Irrigation Management Transfer Programme) which de-
rived from the National Development Plan (1989-1994).
The National Program for Decentralization of the Irriga-
tion Districts took shape in the form of a massive transfer
of public irrigation systems to user groups. In 1996, close
to 3 million hectares, representing 87% of the area under
major and medium irrigation and 46% of the total area
under all irrigation, was transferred to 386 water user
organizations (WUO) divided over 80 irrigation districts
(Saleth and Dinar 1999).
In the transferred irrigation districts, the National Water
Commission provides bulk water to the WUOs, and oper-
ates and maintains headworks for which the WUOs must
pay. The WUOs became responsible for operation, main-
tenance and management of the secondary irrigation and
drainage systems.
In general, the results of the transfer scheme have been
positive. O&M costs have been reduced due to better use
of equipment and machinery and a personnel reduction of
more than 50%. 80% of farmers surveyed in 4 irrigation
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districts stated that the management transfer had improved
water management and allowed for “timely and adequate
delivery and maintenance of the irrigation systems” (Rogers
2002). On average, the irrigation districts have gone from
a financial self-sufficiency rate of 37% in 1991 to a self-
sufficiency rate of 80% in 19946. The key ingredients of the
Mexican transfer program were strong government com-
mitment and policy support, favorable macroeconomic
conditions, establishment of strong legal and institutional
frameworks, substantial increase in farmer contribution to
O&M and on-farm capital improvements, and training
and communication programs (Gorriz et al., 1995).
Private sector participation in the water
supply and sanitation sector in the 1990s
In the early 1990s, PSP was promoted in the Mexican
watsan sector primarily as a means of acquiring much-
needed capital investment and ensuring improved manage-
ment practices and higher efficiency (Idelovitch & Ringskog
1995). As such, the PSP experiments that took place in
Mexico frequently took the shape of more ‘far-reaching’
forms of PSP with numerous Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
contracts and concession contracts being awarded in addi-
tion to a number of service contracts. These first PSP
initiatives, especially those involving relatively strong pri-
vate sector involvement were not very successful. The
experienced problems strongly relate to the Mexican peso
crisis of 1994/1995. Of the 50 BOT contracts awarded in
the early 1990s only 11 are currently operating. In the other
39 cases, either the contract was cancelled or the plants
have yet to be constructed due to a lack of financial funds.
During the peso crisis of 1994/1995, when interest rates
rose to over 100%, it was virtually impossible to raise the
funds for the required investment. The experiences with
concession contracts in Mexico show a similar poor per-
formance. Of the eight concessions contracts that were
prepared only two are currently operational and these
suffered major problems in their first years. The experi-
enced problems by the two operational contracts were
related to political intervention and a government take-
over of the water company. These interventions occurred
after newly elected politicians insisted on altering the
original agreement because of steep tariff increases follow-
ing the financial crisis in 1994/1995.
In contrast to the difficulties experienced with the BOT
and concession contracts less far-reaching service con-
tracts, incorporating no private investment, have proven to
be more successful. Of the 12 service contracts that were
awarded, 8 were actually operational7.
Although the early experiments with private sector in-
volvement appear to have been unsuccessful, the problems
facing the watsan sector in Mexico continue to make
private sector involvement an appealing option for many
municipalities8.
Potential for private sector participation
and the relation with poverty alleviation
Although in actual functioning the two sectors are highly
similar, a fundamental difference reveals itself when exam-
ining the possibilities of charging cost-recovering tariffs for
service provision. It appears that charging cost-recovering
tariffs in the irrigation sector is virtually impossible due to
the fact that most irrigation services are provided with the
aim of alleviating poverty9. Although the provision of both
watsan services as well as irrigation services can have a
strong poverty alleviation component, the nature of that
poverty alleviation component differs between the two
sectors.
In the case of the irrigation sector, provision of services
is directly geared towards generating income for a large
number of farmers by supplying an essential resource in the
agricultural production process. The poverty-alleviation
function of service provision in the irrigation sector has a
number of important consequences for the nature of priva-
tization in the sector. First of all, it more or less excludes the
possibility of full cost recovery because if these farmers
would have to pay commercial (i.e. non-subsidized) tariffs
for the water they use for irrigation, many would not be
able to earn a sufficient income. This means that the
government will have to continue to provide considerable
subsidies to ensure service provision. A consequence of the
continued government subsidies is that, in the irrigation
sector, privatization became a process where service deliv-
ery was privatized to water user associations instead of
(foreign) multinationals10.
In the watsan sector, more potential exists for charging
cost-recovering tariffs11. The consumers’ willingness to pay
cost-recovering tariffs for potable water leads to greater
opportunities for government to attract the private sector
for service provision. In the case of Mexico these opportu-
nities were utilized to access much-needed investment
capital from the private sector. This meant that the forms
of private sector participation that became prevalent in the
watsan sector were BOT contracts and concession con-
tracts. However, the Mexican political and economic con-
text in the 1990s (with frequent political changes and
economic instability), was not very conducive for the far-
reaching forms of privatization, which included private
sector investment.
Conclusion
In the previous section we have argued that the main factor
explaining the different development of private sector
involvement in the irrigation and watsan sectors was the
diverging potential for charging cost-recovering tariffs.
We would expect that in conditions where the potential
for charging cost-recovering tariffs is similar for both
sectors, the development of private sector participation
would also be similar. This means that in parts of Mexico
where cost-recovering tariffs are not possible any develop-
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ment towards PSP will likely follow the lines of manage-
ment transfer as witnessed in the irrigation sector. Simi-
larly, in cases where irrigation services are provided for
high value crops, the potential for PSP to incorporate a
degree of private sector investment increases.
Notes
1 This goes specifically for irrigation schemes with a flow
control system able to give a similar level of service as a
water supply company, i. e. on demand or on semi-
demand water supply. Also, a water source out of the end
user control, i. e. large-scale irrigation schemes.
2 Subtractability refers to the impact that consumption by
incremental users has on consumption opportunities of
all users. Low subtractability  - consumption by one user
does not impede availability to other users. Excludability
refers to the feasibility of controlling access to a good.
High excludability means it is relatively easy (non-costly)
to prevent users from using it. High sunk costs imply low
contestability (Kessides 1993).
3 Capital costs are ‘sunk’ to the extent that they cannot be
recovered for other uses (Kessides 1993).
4 Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution
5 Mexico is a Federation counting 31 states and 1 Federal
District. 25 of the 31 States allow for the awarding of
concessions for public services in their administrative
laws.
6 In most of the irrigation districts, water fees have in
creased after the management transfer. The percent in
crease for 1992-1994 period ranges from 45% to even
180% (CNA, 1994)
7 It must be noted, however, that the impact on utility
performance of these contracts was also very limited
because service contracts only involve outcontracting
part of the tasks undertaken for service provision (often
not core-tasks).
8 With required investments estimated at US$ 5.8 billion
over the next 8 years by the National Water Commission,
many municipalities will be looking towards the private
sector for funds.
9 Although the poverty alleviation objective is often not
explicit, it is implied by the fact that more than 50% of
the irrigated land appear to be low-productive
agriculture. The low productiveness of agriculture is
partly due to the cropping pattern, which is strongly
oriented to cereals (35%) and forage (25%). Moreover,
85% of Mexican farms contribute only 15% of
agricultural products (FAO 2002).
10 This has made the privatization process less controversial
in comparison with privatization in the watsan sector.
Part of the controversy surrounding privatization in the
watsan sector revolves around the dominance of huge
(foreign) multinational corporations in the market. Two
French multinationals (Vivendi and Ondeo) dominate
the market by owning or having interests in water
projects in more than 120 countries and each serving ca.
100 million people (Gleick et al. 2002).
11 In light of the fact that consumers of water delivered by
informal vendors on average pay 12 times more per m3
of water as consumers with house connections, the most
important issue with regard to poverty alleviation in the
watsan sector is increasing service coverage to populations
currently unserved rather than the price of service
provision.
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